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PLATO’S CHARIOTEER:
ON MYTHOS AND LOGOS IN THE DIALOGUES

Augustus M. Snyder
Tyler M. Palombo
PHIL 340: Ancient Greek Philosophy
April 22, 2016

The following essay seeks to characterize the use of both logos and mythos in the Platonic
dialogues as part of a larger effort to determine how truth is conveyed in Plato’s writings. The
relationship between logos and mythos will also be analyzed.
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REFLECTIONS ON MYTHOS AND ITS PLATONIC FORM

I. INTRODUCTION

While Plato may not have outlined a complete theory on the use of muthos or mythos, it
can be reasonably assumed that he interpreted myth as being crucial to the epistemic process and
to his philosophy overall. As noted by Collobert, Destrée, and Gonzalez in the introduction to
Plato and Myth: Studies on the Use and Status of Platonic Myth, “myth becomes an integral and
constitutive part of [Plato’s] philosophical discourse.”1 However, there has been much debate as
to what constitutes a use of myth in Plato’s dialogues, largely as a result of Plato’s hesitance or
failure to precisely describe its essence. As a general term, then, mythos is translated literally as
‘a traditional or recurrent narrative theme or plot structure.’2 In other words, myths are generally
classified as stories with a variety of possible forms; of these, we are left with substantial
ambiguity regarding the form of Platonic myth. In Plato and Myth, for example, it is remarked
that mythos is not always easily distinguishable from logos in Plato’s writings; they often appear
both identical and distinct from each other, as they share many of the same characteristics3 – the

1

Catherine Collobert, Pierre Destrée, and Francisco J. Gonzalez, eds., Plato and Myth: Studies
on the Use and Status of Platonic Myths (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2012) 1. See introduction.
Oxford Dictionaries s.v. “mythos,” accessed April 9th, 2016,
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/mythos
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Collobert, Destrée and Gonzalez, Plato and Myth: Studies on the Use and Status of Platonic
Myths, 1. See introduction.
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object of truth being one of these. Socrates himself states in the Republic4 that “we begin by
telling children fables [i.e. mythoi], and the fable is, taken as a whole, false, but there is truth in it
also” (37a). As Robert Stewart notes in “The Epistemological Function of Platonic Myth,” this
seems to deter one from distinguishing between mythos and logos purely on a basis of validity.5
Stewart goes further to reference two other general features of Platonic myth qua its subject
matter and literary form: (1) it primarily involves “an account of the genesis of something,” and
(2) it is poetic in style, employing both ‘symbolism’ and ‘a liberty of expression.’
Aristophanes’s myth in the Symposium on the origin of love and the nature of human
relationships is an obvious example of both (189d–191d). However, in Stewart’s account, the
first feature is also considered broad enough to include the generation of a philosophical premise
or first principle.6
Others have also reached similar conclusions and have gone further in their attempts to
give a rational account of Platonic myth. Glenn W. Most is one such scholar, and he identifies
the following eight characteristics of Platonic myth in his chapter “Plato’s Exoteric Myths”:7
4

Plato, Republic, translated by Paul Shorey. Reprinted in The Collected Dialogues of Plato, E.
Hamilton and H. Cairns, eds. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961). All references to
Plato's writings are taken from this book with the following translators: Phaedo, Hugh
Treddenick; Meno, W. K. C. Guthrie; Phaedrus, R. Hackforth; Symposium, Michael Joyce;
Theaetetus and Sophist, F. M. Cornford; Statesman, J.B. Skemp; Timaeus, Benjamin Jowett;
Seventh Letter, L.A. Post.
Robert Scott Stewart, “The Epistemological Function of Platonic Myth,” Philosophy and
Rhetoric 22, no. 4 (1989), 262.
5
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Ibid.

Most, Glenn W, “Plato’s Exoteric Myths,” in Plato and Myth: Studies on the Use and Status of
Platonic Myths, eds. Catherine Collobert, Pierre Destrée and Francisco J. Gonzalez (Leiden;
Boston: Brill, 2012), 16-19. The 8 criteria Most identifies are paraphrased as shown; for a
similarly condensed version in his own description, see also Appendix A, p. 24.
7
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1. They are monological.
2. Their narrator is older than the listeners.
3. They belong to oral sources (real or fictional).
4. They are unverifiable.
5. They derive their authority from the tradition (not personal experience).
6. They have a psychagogic effect on their listeners.
7. They are descriptive or narrative – never dialectic.
8. They are located at the beginnings or ends of dialectical expositions.

Most briefly describes and supports each criterion in detail. First, Platonic myths “are
presented orally and by a single speaker without any interruption”. Secondly, the advanced age
of the narrator is alluded to by the respect of its listeners (i.e. the lack of interruption in Greek
conversation). For the fourth list item, “myths deal [either] with the very first things…or the
very last things,” providing either an account of origins or an eschatology, both of which are
unverifiable.8 The sixth criterion indicates the appeal of Platonic myth to its listener’s emotions,
both as delightful entertainment and a strong motivational tool; the seventh distinguishes the
logical procedures of dialectic (including the elenchus and the method of collection and division)
from both the synchronic and diachronic structures of myths. Most concedes that these
characteristics are by no means completely universal or free from controversy, but he maintains
that they are “thoroughly typical of the traditional myths” of Plato and the oral culture of ancient
8

Ibid., 17.
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Greece as a whole.9 An example containing all eight characteristics is the myth of the afterlife at
the end of the Phaedo (107c–115b). Another scholar on the nature of Platonic myth is Monique
Dixsaut, professor emeritus at Panthéon-Sorbonne University. She distinguishes mythos from
logos first by referencing the Hegelian conceptualization: “myth…resorts to and wakens sensory
images suitable for representational thinking whereas logos moves through concepts alone.”10
Later, Dixsaut expands this concept by identifying myth as an essentially enigmatic form of
communication which calls for interpretation; for Dixsaut, this interpretation must be nonallegorical, or perhaps more accurately, beyond mere allegory. In furtherance of her point,
Dixsaut argues for three rules of such an interpretation: (1) The interpreter must have selfknowledge, (2) identify whom the myth is about, and (3) recognize that the message of the myth
is prescriptive, not argumentative.11 In sum, through one’s understanding of oneself, coupled
with the knowledge that myths describe a “typology of souls,” one can rightly interpret the
prescriptive message contained within. Ultimately, these characteristics of Platonic myths and
suggestions for their interpretation provide the necessary basis for the study of its function in the
dialogues.

9

Ibid., 19.

Dixsaut, Monique, “Myth and Interpretation,” in Plato and Myth: Studies on the Use and
Status of Platonic Myths, eds. Catherine Collobert, Pierre Destrée, and Francisco J. Gonzalez
(Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2012), 26.
10

Ibid., 34. Dixsaut uses “cognitive,” but later describes platonic myth as affective rather than
argumentative (p.45), indicating this intended meaning.
11

6

II. THE FUNCTIONS OF PLATONIC MYTH

i. Plato’s Aesthetic Instrumentalism
In the third section of “The Epistemological Function of Platonic Myth,” Stewart argues
for an ‘aesthetic instrumentalism’ of Plato.12 If this interpretation is correct, Plato would have
believed that for art to be considered ‘good,’ it must express, “in an artistic way, that deemed
proper by other non-artistic procedures (i.e. dialectic).” This would seem to be concordant with
the description of art as one of the five ways to truth that Aristotle sets out in Book VI of the
Nicomachean Ethics in which he says that true art is a well-reasoned, productive state [emphasis
added].13 Thus, common misconceptions about instances of art would actually fall under the
contrary description of atechnia or ‘non-art,’ – i.e. that which is a falsely reasoned productive
state. Stewart supports his argument for Plato’s aesthetic instrumentalism by referencing a
passage in Book X of the Republic that implies such a criticism of Homer and other similar
poets.14 Here, Socrates essentially labels classic Homeric poetry as atechnia, or a falsely
reasoned productive state, for its portrayal of dishonorable conduct as acceptable behavior.
Specifically, Socrates notes how, when listening to a poet’s imitation of a hero’s grief, we “feel
pleasure, and abandon ourselves and accompany the representation with sympathy and
eagerness, and we praise as an excellent poet the one who most strongly affects us in this way.”
12

Stewart, “The Epistemological Function” 263-264.

13

Aristotle, The Nichomachean Ethics, trans. J.A.K. Thompson (London: Penguin Books), 149.
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Stewart, “The Epistemological Function,” 264. See 605d-607a in the Plato text.
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Contrary to the usual praise of one’s “ability to remain calm and endure” as conduct befitting a
man, this passage re-emphasizes Plato’s notion that works of art have a strong influence over the
soul.15 Thus, in Plato’s view, poetry which is not in accordance with reason or logos as the
ruling principle ought to be banned from the state; otherwise, “pleasure and pain will be lords of
your city instead of law” (607a). Overall, if the use of mythos in the dialogues can be shown to
have a functional role in Plato’s philosophy in harmony with formal reason, Platonic myth would
sufficiently meet Aristotle’s conditions as a form of art, and the claim that Plato uses myth as
“aesthetic instrumentalism” would be verified.

ii. Myth’s Emotional Appeal and Persuasive Function
It is worth noting here how well Most’s characterization of myth’s emotional appeal (the
sixth of the eight characteristics identified) fits under Plato’s view on the influence of art over the
soul, particularly in relation to the aforementioned passage from the Republic. It would
reasonably follow that the emotional appeal of mythos could be used effectively as a form of
positive persuasion over its audience; otherwise, the frequency of its appearance in the dialogues
would be incongruous with Plato’s artistic instrumentalism outlined above. In this way, the role
of mythos in Plato’s philosophy can transcend passivity as mere communication and assume
instead an active role in the persuasion or, as Most would have it, motivation of the reader. This
precise function of mythos is evidenced quite literally in the Statesman when a young Socrates
discusses the art governing the use of persuasion. This ‘art’ is tasked with “persuading the
general mass of the population by telling them suitable stories (i.e. myths) rather than by giving
Ibid. See also Republic, Bk. III 397d–398b for more on Plato’s critique of mimetic Homeric
poetry and Bk. IV 424d–425d for Plato’s view on the role of music in the state.
15
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them formal instruction (i.e. dialectic)” and is labeled as rhetoric (304c–d). The persuasive
function of Platonic myth is further accounted for when one considers Plato’s intended audience;
as Most notes, “Plato wrote his dialogues not only for philosophically trained readers but also,
and perhaps above all, for potentially interested external non-experts, i.e. for young men (and
their parents) who wanted to know what they should do in life.”16
Pierre Destrée also addresses the emotional appeal and motivational role of Platonic myth
in “Spectacles from Hades. On Plato’s Myths and Allegories in the Republic,” defending the
traditional view of mythic interpretation.17 Destrée suggests that mythoi in Plato are similar in
function to poetic tools of imagery or allegory – namely, in addressing the “irrational part of our
soul”. Thus, allegorical myths are protreptical tools for the motivation of Plato’s audience to
lead a philosophical and morally good life.18 This is subtly represented in the Republic through
Glaucon, the main interlocutor of Socrates; Glaucon, despite having “a natural gift for
philosophy, and great potential for moral goodness,” also has a natural affinity for poetry and
irrational desires, and as such, he is in need of constant persuasion to stay on the right path.19
Therefore, as Socrates’s interlocutor, he is calling for both intellectual demonstration of why the
16

Most, “Plato’s Exoteric Myths,” 22.

Destrée, Pierre, “Spectacles from Hades. On Plato’s Myths and Allegories in the Republic,” in
Plato and Myth: Studies on the Use and Status of Platonic Myths, eds. Catherine Collobert,
Pierre Destrée and Francisco J. Gonzalez (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2012), 111. Destrée defends the
traditional view against more modern interpretations of Platonic myth as a form of philosophical
argument or solely as an intellectual tool, in contrast with views like that of Christopher Rowe.
17
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Ibid., 112.
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Ibid., 115.
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virtuous life is best and, primarily, emotional motivation to pursue such a life.20 In this way, the
allegorical nature of myth is established in accordance with Dixsaut’s conception of the
prescriptive function of Platonic myth, for artistic allegory itself connotes a protreptic intent.
Dixsaut likens this function of mythos to the role of divinatory dreams as described in the
Timaeus (71b–d) – namely, in their use to correctly orient the appetitive part of the soul.21 To
summarize, in a just and temperate individual, the ruling function (i.e. the rational mind) can
exercise influence over the spirited and appetitive (i.e. the irrational) elements of the soul by
appealing to emotion and desire in one’s dreams, employing either terrorizing or soothing
imagery. As she explains, myths like that of Er in the Republic (614b–621d) soothingly convey
“that it is possible [for a soul] to rise above the element of chance and misfortune that all human
life brings with it, and to reconcile fate and choice, necessity and freedom” by choosing a just
life.22 However, Plato’s eschatological myths23 also have a certain dissuasive purpose. For
example, in the Phaedo’s myth of the afterlife, one is dissuaded from wickedness and ignorance
due to the soul’s immortality; death does not offer an escape from the consequences of one’s
deeds (107d; 108b–c). Thus, all Platonic myths enjoin us to orient our conduct properly and to
pursue the power of intelligence – to “raise our heads” as the Phaedo implores us – for it is only
through intelligence and virtuous activity that humankind escapes chaos and disorder.24
20

Ibid., 112.

21

Dixsaut, “Myth and Interpretation,” 45.

22

Ibid.

‘Eschatological’ as being concerned with contemplation of the very last things, thus fulfilling
the fourth of Most’s criteria, among others.
23

24

Dixsaut, “Myth and Interpretation,” 46.
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iii. Myth’s Imaginative Appeal and Cognitive Function
The connection which Destrée makes between myth and poetical imagery (i.e. analogy
and allegory) and the role this plays in the cognitive process should not be overlooked. He
clearly shows that mythos has an imaginative appeal to the intellect as well as an emotional
appeal to the irrational part of the soul. This is shown in three instances where eikôn25 are used
in Books VI and VII of the Republic. The first of these is the analogy of the Sun to the form of
the Good (VI, 509a–c), the function of which seems clear; the analogy is an intellectual tool to
set a basis for the understanding of the form of the Good as responsible for knowledge and truth,
a view that is central to Plato’s entire metaphysics.26 The second eikôn in Book VI of the
Republic is that of the Divided Line (509d–511e), which is even more straightforward in
delivery, if not in scholarly interpretation. Here, Socrates employs geometrical pedagogy
through imagery and proportion to outline objects of thought and states of mind in the epistemic
process (see Fig. 1). Lastly, the third instance is that of the Allegory or Myth of the Cave in
Book VI (514a–517b). As noted by Destrée, this third eikôn is not as straightforward as the
previous ones.27 Thus, understanding the significance of the Cave and its relation to the Divided
Line requires further elaboration. Furthermore, the formal statuses of both the Cave and the
Divided Line as mythos or logos have yet to be established. For now, let them stand simply as
Oxford Dictionaries s.v. “icon,” accessed April 10th, 2016,
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/icon. Greek, meaning
‘image’ or ‘likeness,’ – origin of English “Icon.”
25

26

Destrée, “Spectacles from Hades,” 117-118.

27

Ibid., 118.

11
further examples of imaginative appeal in Plato’s use of mythos. In addition, it is worth noting
how each of the three eikôn mentioned above fit under the description of myth referenced by
Dixsaut as “Hegelian”; each calls upon sensual imagery, whether directly or abstractly, for the
dissemination of its underlying ideas.

Fig. 1. F. M. Cornford, Plato: The Line. Source: Ken Schles. 2011, Digital Image.
Available from: https://kenschles.wordpress.com/2011/07/24/allegory-of-the-cave-thedialectic-of-the-image-is-thus/ (accessed April 21, 2016). Original from The Republic of
Plato (Cornford translation, Oxford University Press). We consider F. M. Cornford’s
interpretation of the Divided Line to be fairly accurate in accordance with the description
in the dialogues. Here, the two ‘worlds’ are not meant to be taken literally as two separate
worlds, but rather as two ontological orders of one reality – specifically, one dealing with
intelligibles and one with sense perceptibles.
Dixsaut also comments on the role of Platonic myth in the cognitive process in terms of
its imaginative appeal. For instance, she notes that myth is not limited in its expression;

12
everything is subject to its discussion, but always in relation to the soul and its experiences.28
Thus, myth can discuss both that which is sense-perceptible and that which is intellectual in
form, yet still demand abstract interpretation for each by appealing to our imagination through
symbolism and analogy. As examples of these respective roles, consider the myths in the
Timaeus and the Phaedrus. In the former, the myth discusses the creation of the sensible world
in its entirety, as well as the bodies and souls contained therein, in explicitly physical terms
(30c–92c); it relates the processes of bodies, both heavenly and human, to their soul
counterparts, even claiming that three parts of the human soul reside in specific parts of the body,
such as the divine part residing in the liver whereas the two mortal parts reside in the stomach
and the heart (70a–72d). In contrast, the Phaedrus discusses the purely intelligible forms of
Justice, Temperance, and Knowledge directly, describing them as nourishment to the wings of
the soul (247d), which it portrays as a team of two steeds guided by a charioteer (246a). In both
cases, myth is, as Dixsaut notes, speaking “in a different way”29 – namely, by relying on allegory
and analogy. In this ‘different’ way of communication, myth forces its audience to ‘see’
differently for a correct interpretation. Dixsaut puts it nicely: “…relating a myth is to make us
see [author’s emphasis].” 30 This, Dixsaut argues, is also key to identifying whom a myth is about
– “to see” a myth in Plato’s dialogues is to identify its portrayal of a “typology of souls.”
Destrée and Dixsaut are not alone in their proposal that Platonic myths have an
imaginative appeal; Stewart argues for such a function as well. As he says, “…insofar as
28

Dixsaut, “Myth and Interpretation,” 38.

29

Ibid., 39.

30

Ibid., 40-42.
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something can be labelled a Platonic myth, it must use language of a sort that makes one begin
thinking in the conceptual realm rather than within the physical.”31 However, Stewart also notes
that myths generally speak in material terms, relying heavily on physical images. For example,
in the myth noted above in the Phaedrus, Plato uses sensual descriptions to liken the tripartite
soul to a charioteer and his two horses (246a). In addition, consider the myth of the afterlife at
the end of the Phaedo and that of the creation myth in the Timaeus, mentioned above; both speak
in explicitly physical terms. Steward adds, “But, of course, myth is not restricted to the terms in
which it expresses itself,” 32 for it is, in essence, highly symbolic. Thus, the soul in the Phaedrus
is not to be taken literally as a charioteer and his horses, nor is the geography of the world or the
creation of its parts exactly as the Phaedo and Timeaeus describe; one must “see differently,” or
begin to think “in the conceptual realm” to understand their meaning. As Stewart argues, “In this
way myth is enabled to operate within the epistemic process by forming a bridge from the realm
of the physical to that of the intelligible.”33 Therefore, it is precisely this symbolic characteristic
of myth which gives it a functional role in the epistemic process. In developing this point, he
likens the cognitive function of myth to dianoia34 as described in the Republic and represented in
the Divided Line (see Fig. 1). In this state of mind, “they make use of the visible forms and talk
about them, though they are not thinking of them but of those things of which they are a likeness,
pursuing their inquiry for the sake of the square as such and the diagonal as such, and not for the
31

Stewart, “The Epistemological Function,” 279.

32

Ibid., 265.

33

Ibid., 266.

34

Ibid. Dianoia, translated from Greek, means “thinking.”
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sake of the image of it which they draw” (Republic, VI, 510d). Thus, both Platonic myth and the
geometrical sciences make use of physical imagery to symbolize and draw attention to purely
conceptual objects.35

iv. Conclusion / Transition to Logos
Socrates himself comments in the Republic that in dialectics, one must make “no use
whatever of any object of sense but only of pure ideas moving on through ideas and ending with
ideas” (VI, 511c). However, as Stewart notes, this is complicated by the fact that “it is
extraordinarily difficult, if not impossible, to express oneself in non-physical terms.”
Furthermore, it is “difficult or impossible to be understood when one does attempt to
communicate in these terms.”36 Socrates describes this difficulty to Glaucon in the Republic:
“You will not be able, dear Glaucon, to follow me any further, though on my part there will be
no lack of good will. And if I could, I would show you, no longer an image and symbol of my
meaning, but the very truth, as it appears to me” (533a).
Thus, short of successfully describing the “very truth” itself, mythos, by using images and
symbols, communicates to others the truths reached by dialectic. One example of this is the
myth of Er in the Republic; Stewart highlights how this eschatological myth communicates “the
value of the just over the unjust life”37 in its persuasive appeal for one to choose justice. In this
example, the myth communicates the conclusion reached via the dialectics employed throughout
35

Ibid.

36

Ibid., 273.

37

Ibid., 265.
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the entirety of the dialogue and satisfies Glaucon’s desire for an emotionally appealing
motivation to pursue the just life.
Myth goes beyond serving as mere philosophic ‘spokesperson,’ however; as Catherine
Collobert describes in “The Platonic Art of Myth-Making: Myth as Informative Phantasma,”
myth takes an active role in the transference of the skhêma (i.e. sketch or outline) of truth.
Specifically, Collobert describes myth as a verbal, philosophic image responsible for the “visible
and perceptible expression” of truth.38 It is also important to note that the truths which myths
express are also not limited to dialectical conclusions; as Stewart argues, myth is also responsible
for the communication of first principles (i.e. the starting-points or axioms) of philosophic
argument. For example, the form of the Good can be considered a first principle of Plato’s
theory of forms, as it is necessary for the understanding of all other forms. The only instances
where Plato offers any insight to this first principle of the Good itself are in Books VI and VII of
the Republic, in those three eikôn mentioned above. As each eikôn proves insufficient, Socrates
progresses from an analogy which compares the Good to the Sun, to an image outlining the
entire epistemic process, and finally, to a complete myth in order to express the truth.39 This
heavy reliance upon mythos to communicate a first principle indicates its role in expressing more
completely that which is indemonstrable, or that which logos assumes to begin demonstration.
That is not to say that mythos is the sole source of this communication, nor that it exercises
complete authority over logos; rather, mythos simply accomplishes something which logos or
Collobert, Catherine, “The Platonic Art of Myth-Making: Myth as Informative Phantasma,” in
Plato and Myth: Studies on the Use and Status of Platonic Myths, eds. Catherine Collobert,
Pierre Destrée and Francisco J. Gonzalez (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2012), 98-100. In addition,
Collobert comments on myth’s didactic and persuasive functions which assert themselves
through myth’s cognitive and emotional appeal – see p. 106-107.
38

39

Stewart, “The Epistemological Function,” 276.
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dialectics struggles to do because of its restriction to what is purely conceptual. Similarly, logos
accomplishes that which mythos cannot, and, in fact, is more authoritative than mythos. Stewart
eloquently describes this relationship:

Myth remains in a subservient position to dialectics because insofar as it is good, it
remains under the Platonic dictum for writing that one ‘must first know the subject you
write . . . about’ (Seventh Letter, 341c) and it is only through the use of dialectics that one
can learn of those philosophical truths which are then communicated through myth.40
Thus, mythos works in conjunction with logos to increase one’s knowledge and
understanding; this will be discussed in more detail in the third section. We conclude this
section on mythos in Plato’s dialogues by proposing that through both its emotional and
imaginative appeals, mythos occupies an active and important role in Plato’s philosophy.
Generally speaking, this role is to motivate the reader or listener to think more deeply and to
pursue a morally good life founded on intelligence. Specifically, myths serve as ‘cognitive
bridges,’ so to speak, from the physical to the purely intelligible, and function in the
communication of truths – whether first principles or final conclusions. As Stewart concludes,
myths “prove necessary both for that [epistemic] process to begin and for it to end.”41 Here, it
now seems appropriate to give a similar account of logos in Plato’s work.

40

Ibid., 277.

41

Ibid., 279.
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RELFECTIONS ON LOGOS AND ITS PLATONIC FORM

I.

INTRODUCTION

The precise nature of logos is similarly difficult to describe since understanding a given
use of logos depends heavily upon the variable context in which it is found. In early Pre-Socratic
thought, Heraclitus used the term, logos, for the unity that is both unchangeable and everlasting
in reference to all that exists.42 Parmenides showed that logos was more closely aligned with
reason, defining it as “speech, account, or argument.”43 However, in the dialogues, Plato uses
words other than logos to indicate the type of cognition distinctive to humans: noesis, dianoia,
and logismos. Given the alternate ways that Plato refers to rational cognition, logos assumes a
different characteristic in the Platonic dialogues; logos is used not to depict reason but rather as
the “deliverance of reason,” as Jessica Moss describes, in the sense that it provides the structure
through which reason is produced.44 Despite the differences in the various uses of the term, there
is a clear indication that logos has a part in reason and argument; it is through logos that
knowledge is obtained. In the Theaetetus, Socrates indicates this explicit function: “So when a
man gets hold of the true notion of something without an account [i.e. logos], his mind does
think truly of it, but he does not know it, for if one cannot give and receive an account of a thing,
one has no knowledge of that thing (202b-202c).
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, s.v. “Heraclitus” by Daniel Graham, last modified June
23, 2015, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/heraclitus/.
42

Jessica Moss, “Right Reason in Plato and Aristotle: On the Meaning of Logos,” Phronesis: A
Journal of Ancient Philosophy 59, no. 3 (2014): 183.
43

44

Ibid.
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Logos, therefore, is the medium through which knowledge is obtained. Throughout the
dialogues, Plato indicates that to know something is to be able to provide an account of it; by
aligning these definitions, we can infer that logos means some sort of rational account of any
particular thing. In addition to logos, Plato classifies each attempt to determine truth through
reasoned inquiry as a form of “the dialectic.”45 The main application of the dialectic is to convey
truth with respect to a specific subject of discussion. The term itself, however, is applied to a
variety of different methods within the dialogues. These methods include the elenchus, the
method of hypothesis, the method of collection and division, and the dialectic method
(understood as distinct from the general characterization of all the methods as “dialectical”.
Some scholars note that the application of “the dialectic” to each method is an indication that
Plato’s mode for reason grew over time; others indicate that the methods themselves are different
and therefore convey truth in an analogous if not equal way.46 In order to better understand
Plato’s use of logos, each form of the dialectic will be analyzed. This analysis will include a
characterization of each method used in the dialogues and treatments of the topic in relevant
secondary sources. It will consider various applications of the different methods with a view
toward assessing their wider importance. Understanding logos in the Platonic dialogues is
essential to understanding Plato as a philosopher and the importance of reason for a well-ordered
life.

Miriam Byrd, “Dialectic and Plato’s Method of Hypothesis,” Aperion: A Journal for Ancient
Philosophy and Science 40, no. 2 (2007): 150.
45

46

Ibid.
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II.

i.

THE VARIOUS METHODS OF LOGOS

The Elenchus
Elenchus, the most primitive mode for determining truth, is presented in the early

dialogues and can be considered the first form of Plato’s dialectic. Noted for producing a
condition of puzzlement, “the Socratic elenchus was...a prolonged cross-examination which
refutes the opponent’s original thesis by getting him to draw from it, by means of a series of
questions and answers, a consequence that contradicts it.”47 This question and answer dynamic
was the first method provided in the Platonic dialogues aimed at determining what the essence of
any specific thing is; a question would be posed [usually by Socrates himself], regarding the
topic of moral truths, and a dialogue would ensue between Socrates and whoever he was
questioning.48 In the Meno, for instance, Socrates posits a question regarding the exact nature of
general virtue and Meno attempts to answer. A short excerpt proceeds as follows:
SOCRATES: Well then, didn’t you say that a man’s virtue lay in directing the city well,
and a woman’s in directing her household well?
MENO: Yes.
SOCRATES: And is it possible to direct anything well, city or household or anything
else, if not temperately and justly?
MENO: Certainly not.
SOCRATES: And that means with temperance and justice?
MENO: Of course.
SOCRATES: Then both man and woman need the same qualities, justice and
temperance, if they are going to be good.
MENO: It looks like it. (73b)
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Despite his repeated attempts, Meno’s assertions are unable to withstand Socrates’
questioning. At the conclusion of the dialogue, the elenctic argument has rendered no
satisfactory answer to the initial question of "What is virtue?" In this sense, elenchus is unique
among the various forms of reasoning in Plato. Unlike the other forms of the dialectic, elenchus
very rarely produces any truth outside of the understanding that the initial assertion [or the
assertions made afterwards] are inconsistent with the beliefs of the person being questioned.49
The Meno exists as a dialogue on virtue, but the main information provided at the conclusion of
the elenctic argument is that Meno’s assumptions are not correct.
Many scholars, noting that elenctic argument very rarely produces truth outside of
demonstrating a person’s incorrect beliefs, argue that elenchus occupies a solely negative
function within the dialogues, demonstrating to people their ignorance without providing truth on
the subject of which the person was originally ignorant.50 Robinson argues, elenchus served as a
“propaedeutic: a preparation of knowledge though not in itself productive of knowledge or
virtue.”51 However, this very characteristic of elenchus is what generates the importance the
method has within the dialogues. In the Sophist, Plato asserts that one “cannot profit from the
knowledge offered…until the elenchus is applied and the man is refuted and brought to shame,
thus purifying him from opinions that hinder learning and causing him to think he knows only
Christopher King, “Wisdom, Moderation, and Elenchus in Plato’s Apology,” Metaphilosophy
39, no. 3 (2008): 360.
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what he does know and no more.” 52 Ignorance presupposes an understanding of a topic for
which a person either has no understanding or an incorrect understanding. Consequently, people
possessing knowledge are unable to search for truth, because no rational person would search for
something they are already think they have in their possession. Therefore, the ignorant person is
reliant upon elenchus to get rid of ignorance and initiate the philosophical process: “At least it
seems that we have made him more likely to find the truth. For now he will be glad to search for
it because he knows he does not know it” (84b).
In addition, scholars note that the person participating in elenchus (e.g. Socrates) does not
convict one of ignorance, it is the elenctic argument that does this.53 The function of elenchus,
therefore, is decidedly positive; although it doesn’t provide truth, it initiates a curiosity and
desire to know. As Robinson argued, “philosophy begins in wonder, and the assertion here made
is that the elenchus supplies that wonder.”54

ii.

The Method of Hypothesis
Elenchus, although used generously in the early dialogues, is never specifically defined.

As noted by King, “in Plato’s early dialogues, Socrates’ inquiries demonstrate a pattern of
investigation whose rationale he does not investigate.”55 However, as the dialectic becomes
more refined, a different version of logos is presented for which a definition is provided. The
method of hypothesis is specifically defined in the Phaedo: “I first lay down the theory which I
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judge to be soundest, and that whatever seems to agree with it–with regard to either causes or
anything else–I assume to be true, and whatever does not I assume not to be true” (100a-101d).
As noted in the description above, the hypothetical method begins with an asserted claim;
this asserted claim must be the strongest claim that can be made about the subject of discussion.
Information that supports and aligns with the claim is then considered true while all else
considered false.56 Then, the conclusions drawn from accepting all that aligns with the claim are
analyzed for consistency:

If anyone should fasten upon the hypothesis itself, you would disregard him and refuse to
answer until you could consider whether its consequences were mutually consistent or
not. And when you had to substantiate the hypothesis itself, you would proceed in the
same way, assuming whatever more ultimate hypothesis commended itself most to you,
until you reached one which was satisfactory. (100a–101d).

When the conclusions drawn from the hypotheses were inconsistent with either
experience or reason, this inconsistency was alleviated by the development of a “higher
hypothesis.”57 The term “higher hypotheses” is meant to indicate that, as inconsistencies are
dealt with, the new hypothesis that is asserted encompasses all that it had before as well as
resolving the apparent contradiction with the previous hypothesis. Therefore, it is “higher” in the
sense that it pervades over a greater area, involving both the previous hypothesis as well as those
conclusions not initially consistent with it. An example of the method of hypothesis proceeds as
follows:
SOCRATES: [in reference to virtue] “Will it be teachable? Isn’t it plain to everyone that
a man is not taught anything except knowledge?
MENO: That would be my view.
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SOCRATES: If on the other hand virtue is some sort of knowledge, clearly it could be
taught.
MENO: Certainly.
SOCRATES: So that question is easily settled–I mean, on what condition virtue would be
teachable.
MENO: Yes
SOCRATES: The next point then, I suppose, is to find out whether virtue is knowledge
or something different. (87c–d)

In the above example, some information about virtue is provided at the conclusion of the
dialogue. The hypothesis that is asserted in this section of the Meno is that, if virtue is
knowledge then it can be taught. After a prolonged discussion, it is concluded by the
interlocutors that virtue is unable to be formally taught, therefore apparently rendering it
something other than knowledge. With respect to formal logic, the method of hypothesis in this
example has been characterized by some scholars as a type of modus tollens; by proving that the
consequent does not hold (in this case, that virtue can be taught), the negation of the antecedent
can be inferred (which in this case is that virtue is not knowledge). This version of the dialectic
is more sophisticated than the elenchus since it goes beyond merely demonstrating the invalidity
of specific beliefs and tries to develop by argument something that is true. Although it is not
necessarily true that each example of the method of hypothesis exists as a type of modus tollens,
the example is meant to highlight something that is necessarily true about the method of
hypothesis; namely, that it indirectly points to some truth about the subject being discussed.
Whereas the elenchus was simply a preparation of knowledge by alleviating ignorance, the
method of hypothesis points towards truth in a more formal way while not entirely grasping the
essence of the subject in question. Thus, in this instance of logos, there is both upward and
downward progression of thought; one moves “upward” to form new, more ultimate hypotheses
while also moving “downwards” since the old hypothesis can be deduced from the more
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adequate one.58 In this sense, the method of hypothesis provides principles that can be both
deduced from and inferred to.
In the dialogues, the method of hypothesis is both described and illustrated, however,
there are serious questions concerning the ultimate aim of the method of hypothesis; these
largely arise from the ambiguous context that surrounds description of the method. As
mentioned in the Phaedo, Socrates argues that “higher hypotheses” should be found until an
adequate stopping point is reached, with the ambiguous term “adequate” lending itself to
multiple interpretations.59 Some have insisted that “adequate” is meant to only indicate a
hypothesis that satisfies a critic of some sort, i.e. provides a sufficient answer to a question that
was posed. This interpretation aims to reduce the hypothetical method to something less
significant than philosophical discourse and more aligned with debate; the hypothesis, without
arriving at the truth, would be adequate if it satisfied the critic. This attempt at reduction is
incorrect, however, both with respect to the stopping point as well as the theoretical placement of
the method of hypothesis as a tool solely in argument. As noted by Byrd, Plato argues that “one
must account for a hypothesis whether or not that hypothesis has an objector.”60 From this
account, the method of hypothesis is a means of determining truth rather than answering a critic.
This interpretation of “adequate” is not adequate; there is still a need for a more accurate
account.
The context of the description of the method of hypothesis does provide some insight
(albeit sometimes ambiguously) into Plato’s meaning of an “adequate stopping point.” Some
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scholars have indicated that the “adequate stopping” referred to in the dialogues could very well
coincide with the form of the dialectic mentioned in the Republic, where it was shown that
“higher” hypotheses would be grasped until the highest hypotheses [the forms; and with these
forms, true knowledge] were obtained. This will be discussed further in the concluding section
where dialectic, in the general sense, is treated. In the Meno, the interlocutors arrive at the
conclusion that virtue is not knowledge, but this introduces a new hypothesis to be considered,
which has yet to be considered. Thus, a positive step has been taken, with more steps to be taken
in the future.

iii.

The Method of Collection and Division
The method of hypothesis requires upward movement to higher hypothesis and

downward movement to implications of the hypothesis. In another form of the dialectic, Plato
does not discuss this upward and downward movement of hypotheses. Instead, the form of logos
presented primarily in the Sophist and the Phaedrus is meant to systematize concepts in order to
determine the essence of a specific “Kind.”61 The method of collection and division is the most
sophisticated example of philosophical practice since it has the capability of directly arriving at a
definition. Plato argues that this method allows people to become better dialecticians,
“discovering how to display in an account the things that are.”62
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Inherent in the method of collection and division is the dialectical process necessary for
dividing all the members of a specific “Kind”63 from other “Kinds”. Unlike the hypothetical
method, the method of collection and division seeks to separate the contents of the discussion
based on these contradictions with no ability to move “upward” in creating a more encompassing
assertion; movement seeks to locate a genus (Kind) and then identify the various species. In the
Phaedrus, the general schema of the method is displayed: “The first is that in which we bring a
dispersed plurality under a single form, seeing it all together – the purpose being to define soand-so, and thus to make plain whatever may be chosen as the topic for exposition… [Division
is] the reverse of [this], whereby we are enabled to divide into forms.”64
Specifically, collection and division is a four step process meant to determine the
essential characteristics of a specific Kind.65 First, an initial assertion is made as to the necessary
characteristics of the specific Kind. The veracity of the initial assertion depends on whether
there are instances of that Kind which do not contain the specified characteristics. If the
necessary characteristics are in fact determined to be necessary,66 all members of that Kind
containing the characteristic are “collected.” Then, a conjecture is made as to “what features
should be added to mark off things of that Kind from all other things.”67 In this sense, “add” is
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meant to indicate specific features that distinguishes the specific Kind in question from the
particulars that fall under the general definition inherent in the first step of the process.68 This
conjecture is then tested by determining if there are things outside of the specific Kind in
question that contain these characteristics. If not, a division occurs. This divisional process is
repeated, with characteristics added at each step, until only the essence of the initial Kind in
question remains. An example of the method, taken from the Sophist, follows:

STRANGER: [with regard to finding the definition of an angler] Let us begin by asking
whether he is a man having art or not having art, but some other power.
THEAETETUS: He is clearly a man of art.
STRANGER: [after further discussion regarding the Angler] Seeing, then, that all arts are
either acquisitive or creative, in which class shall we place the art of the angler?
THEAETETUS: Clearly in the acquisitive class.
STRANGER: And the acquisitive may be subdivided into two parts. There is exchange,
which is voluntary and is affected by gifts, hire, purchase, and the other part of
acquisitive, which takes by force of word or deed, may be termed conquest? (219c–d).

The method of collection and division enables one to come closer to truth than either the
method of elenchus or hypothesis since the essential nature of a specific Kind can be determined
directly, i.e. the exact nature of the Sophist or that of the angler can be precisely specified.
The ability of the method of collection and division to provide for truth, however, is
possible only if one has the ability to accurately collect and divide with regard to the Kind in
question. Socrates argued in the Phaedrus that one must make the “proper divisions’ and not
merely “hack off parts like a clumsy butcher” (266b). The method of collection and division
requires that correct divisions be made; given the infinite amount of divisions that are possible
Ibid. To further clarify this use of “add”, consider an example: If I group together cars, all of
that specific Kind will be collected. Then, by adding the characteristic of engine type, all cars
will be further divided based on the aforementioned characteristic.
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with respect to any one thing, only the divisions necessary to arrive at that thing’s essence [or
definition] should be utilized. "The criticism that the method is not universally applicable is
invalid; the method is the same, but the subject of collection and division is always changing."
Plato does indicate that the dialectician must divide according to the “natural joints of the
world.”69 In this sense, although an infinite number of divisions are possible, the divisions must
be made in accordance with nature. Therefore, in order to effectively use this method, one must
already have an understanding of the essence of the subject in order to make the correct division.
This is said to present a problem, the so-called "Socratic Paradox," that claims one cannot
presuppose specific characteristics of the very thing that is being defined.70 As a counter to this
claim, it has been suggested that the "Socratic Paradox" is not really a defect since it is possible
that Plato felt that the questions and topics that were dealt with using this method were
understood in a general way.71 Thus, Plato indicates that the method of collection and division
forces one to become more dialectical, as noted by the Stranger in the Sophist.72 The type of
understanding required to perform the method of collection and division provides a deeper
understanding of the natural divisions of both sensible and intelligible objects. Unlike the
method of hypothesis and the elenchus, the method of collection and division can be utilized for
discovering truths in areas other than ethics. Neither the elenchus nor the method of hypothesis
could be used to define the nature of the angler, only the method of collection and division has
this capability.
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The method of collection and division, therefore, is more philosophical in nature than the
method of hypothesis; the method of hypothesis relies on asserting a thesis and then analyzing
beliefs and information regarding that thesis, whereas the method of collection and division
requires a deeper understanding of both the sensual and conceptual world in order to identify the
essence of any given thing. Plato indicates in the Sophist that the nature of the philosopher is to
be practiced in the dialectic, with the dialectic existing as the ability to differentiate all that is the
same with respect to a certain Kind.73 However, despite the ability to determine the essence of
something directly, the method of collection and division is still unable to provide for the first
principles. Although it is able to provide for the essential nature of any one kind of thing, it does
so largely in reference to concepts outside of the beginning ideas; there is no mention of the
method of collection and division ever demonstrating the fundamental principles underlying
philosophical inquiry.74

iv.

Concluding Remarks on the Dialectic
The elenchus, the method of hypothesis, and the method of collection and division are all

forms of logos within the dialogues, such that Plato refers to each as a practice of “the
dialectic.”75 ‘Dialectic’ functions here as a categorical term to describe the various methods of
reasoning described by Plato. However, the treatment of the term in the Republic indicates that
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“the dialectic” is not only a categorical term, but is itself a distinctive method of reasoning; here,
the term ‘dialectic’ is used without reference to any other methods of reasoning.76
Since Plato used the term ‘dialectic’ to apply to a variety of methods of argument and
reason, the discussion of dialectic in the literature contains some ambiguities. However, there is
reasonable evidence presented in the Republic that the above mode of defining the dialectic,
where the dialectic is purely used as a categorical term, is inaccurate and that “the dialectic” is in
fact a separate and distinct form of Platonic logos. The first description of the dialectic is
substantially different from the method of collection and division, “In like manner, when anyone
by dialectic attempts through discourse of reason and apart from all perceptions of sense to find
his way to the very essence of each thing and does not desist till he apprehends by thought itself
the nature of the good in itself, he arrives at the limit of the intelligible” (VI, 532a). Unlike the
method of collection and division, the dialectic deals only with the intelligible, for it is by
thought alone that the dialectic is practiced. Therefore, there is no foreseeable situation where
the dialectic could provide an account of the angler; the dialectic, Robinson argues, is “the
highest method, dealing only with understanding of conceptual forms.”77 Moreover, the dialectic
is the only method able to grasp the “nature of the good in itself.” The nature of the good
provides the dialectic with its ability to grasp the essence of each thing; Plato argues that the
“greatest thing to learn is the idea of the Good by reference to which just things and all the rest
become useful and beneficial” (VI, 505a). It is by an understanding of the Good, Plato asserts,
As mentioned previously, Plato uses the term “the dialectic” to refer to the various methods. In
the Republic, he uses “the dialectic” as the name of the method itself, distinguishing it from the
general sense of the word in the earlier dialogues.
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the function of all things becomes apparent.78 Further explanation is provided through the
comparison between the visible and intelligible realms as they apply to the Myth of the Cave. In
the Myth of the Cave, Plato indicates the sun, although not vision itself, is the cause of vision
through its nature of providing light (VI, 508c). Likewise, the idea of the Good is to the
intelligible region as the sun is to the visible region; the idea of the Good, while it is not itself
understanding or knowledge, provides the basis for understanding and knowledge by
demonstrating a specific thing’s function. Therefore, the understanding of the idea of the Good is
a substantial distinction inherent in the dialectic as it is presented in the Republic against all other
presentations of logos in the dialogues. Dialectic allows one to arrive at the limit of the
intelligible and obtain knowledge of the forms themselves; the forms are intelligible, and it
would not be possible to arrive at the limit of the intelligible if the forms themselves were not
understood. It is through the forms that one is able to grasp the most purified and essential form
of knowledge, as noted by the highest distinction on the Divided Line (see Fig. 1), and since the
dialectic provides an understanding of the forms, the dialectic is the most important version of
logos within the dialogues: “Only the dialectical way of inquiry proceeds in this direction,
destroying the hypotheses, to the beginning itself in order to make it secure” (VI, 532d).
Plato seeks to demonstrate the dialectic as an upward path of reasoning that concludes
with understanding of the forms themselves. Unlike the method of hypothesis, the dialectic does
not proceed downwards; it proceeds upwards in the direction of first principles.79 Socrates
argues that, in the dialectic, reason uses hypotheses as “stepping stones to take off from, enabling
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it to reach the hypothetical first principle.”80 The method of hypothesis, by virtue of continually
approaching “higher hypotheses”, could theoretically find its stopping point at the first
principles; however, this is not a requirement, i.e. the method of hypothesis could conclude prior
to reaching first principles. However, the dialectic, if properly practiced, is unable to conclude
prior to demonstrating first principles. In the Sophist, the stranger indicates that the dialectician
is the one who can distinguish according to kinds, i.e. distinguish objects based on their essence
or essential character. This once again indicates the tie between the dialectic and the forms
themselves, demonstrating the implied importance of the dialectic as presented in the Republic.

v.

Conclusion / Transition to Final Argument
Presented in the above analysis are the various methods of logos in the Platonic

dialogues: the elenchus, the method of hypothesis, the method of collection and division, and the
dialectic as presented in the Republic. Each method demonstrates a way of advancing towards
truth. The elenchus provides little truth outside of demonstrating ignorance on the part of an
interlocutor. However, this ignorance provides the initial spur towards understanding. The
method of hypothesis, although providing truth only indirectly, is able to test hypotheses in order
to reach wider and more adequate positions. The method of collection and division goes beyond
the method of hypothesis in that it is able to provide definitions by genus and species. Lastly, the
dialectic is able to provide one with an understanding of the first principles; it leads its
participants to the very beginning of philosophical practice. However, it cannot demonstrate
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these first principles. Furthermore, expressing these principles also remains beyond the capacity
of logos; in the Platonic dialogues, this task is accomplished through mythos.

RECONCILING MYTHOS AND LOGOS
I.

FINAL ARGUMENT

Mythos and logos are both instrumentally important within the dialogues; there are few
dialogues, if any, that do not contain both. Given the myriad uses of each throughout the
dialogues, it is reasonable to assume that there exists a relationship between mythos and logos
that warrants their consistent use. This relationship, although never explicitly stated by Plato, is
evident in the account that is given of the relation of two terms that are, in many ways, analogous
to mythos and logos – namely, ‘true opinion’ and ‘knowledge’. In the Meno, Socrates
distinguishes and compares the two directly; although the basis for each differs, both are capable
of conveying truth, or of guiding one towards the correct path of life. In brief, “true opinion is as
good a guide as knowledge for the purpose of acting rightly” (97a–d).
True opinion, sometimes referred to as intuition, consists of a general sense of the truth of
something without having an ability to rationally account for why it is true. For example, a
guide knows the correct way to reach a destination but is unable to articulate how he knows the
correct way other than the fact that he simply does. As previously mentioned, mythos can be
considered a fictional account of the genesis of something, and specifically, the genesis of
philosophical thought.81 These “first principles” provide the basis for every field of study; it is
these first principles that provide myth its ability to convey truth, for the first principles are
undoubtedly truthful in themselves, yet incapable of demonstration. The truth that the myth
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conveys, therefore, is not dependent on the factual nature of the myth itself, for myths are not
meant to be taken literally. Therefore, there must exist some other means to validate the assertion
than an analysis of the premises that provided it; however, this seems to be a very difficult view
to defend rationally, for what is there by which to judge a conclusion if not by the preceding
material that was offered in support it? This reasonable concern may be overcome through
further contemplation of the dialogues. For example, if mythos is taken to be analogous to true
opinion, some insight as to establishing the validity of claims made in a myth may be gained
from this statement in the Meno: “True opinions are a fine thing and do all sorts of good so long
as they stay in their place, but they will not stay long. They run away from a man’s mind; so they
are not worth much until you tether them by working out the reason…. Once they are tied down,
they become knowledge [emphasis added]” (97b–c).
The tethering reason that Socrates refers to is undoubtedly logos. It is through the use of
reason or logos, applied to experience and thought, that one can establish the validity of a myth’s
assertions. Logos is unable to provide for these first principles; it is from these first principles
that logos proceeds to conclusions. Thus, the validity of a myth’s assertions can be ascertained
by their logical conclusions, in accordance with common experience. For example, the Principle
of Non-Contradiction is unable to be proved deductively; however, it is the basis– the first
principle –for a plethora of existing proofs, as it accords with common experience that a
statement cannot be simultaneously the same as and different from itself. Therefore, logos
provides the means to validate the assertions of Platonic myths by analyzing all that follows from
them (i.e. their logical conclusions). Mythos accomplishes the production and communication of
first principles within the Platonic dialogues because of the relative inability of logos to do
so. The most reasonable way to understand this relationship is to recognize that, in order for
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demonstration not to continue ad infinitum, there must be a starting point that has no need to be
proven; mythos provides these starting points.
The relationship between logos and mythos can be further explained by characterizing
Platonic myth as a form of art in the Aristotelian sense. As described previously, Aristotle
argues that art “is a productive state that is truly reasoned.” In order to judge whether reason was
involved in producing any specific thing, that which is produced is evaluated. Thus, the quality
of the product signifies its relative status as art or non-art (atechnia).82 This, as we argued, was
the basis of Plato’s criticism of mimetic Homeric poetry. As for Plato’s art, mythos is concerned
with bringing into existence a philosophical beginning– a first principle –in a manner that is
fictional, emotional, and largely imaginative.83 Therefore, in order to determine if this specific
art form was produced from a reasoned state, the conclusion that is reached from a myth must be
analyzed. This analysis must occur via the use of logos; logos provides the tools to determine if
myth arose from a well-reasoned state, and therefore assists in determining if a given myth
conveys truth. In this sense, myth relies on logos to bolster the truth of its conviction, and logos
protects against bad or falsely reasoned myths as well as their erroneous conclusions and
potential for unscrupulous persuasion.
An illustration of this relationship is found in the Republic when mythos is combined with
logos via the Myth of the Cave and the image of the Divided Line. In the Myth of the Cave,
Plato provides a fictitious account: a man is removed from the depths of a cave and forced to
transition from only comprehending the “shadows” of real objects to understanding the greatest
good. This allegory serves a variety of functions: while illustrating the state in which the
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common man exists, Plato provides a mythical account of how learning takes place in general.
Although this account of how one learns will not be discussed in detail, the same process is
explicitly outlined in the image of the Divided Line, but with an added feature. In this image, the
learning process is depicted geometrically by ratios, with proportionality present between the
various states of mind as well as their objects. In addition, there are suggestions as to how one
might move to the top of the line, increasing one’s intellectual ability until eventually
understanding the forms. With respect to logos and mythos, the Cave story is solely mythical: it
presents a fictitious account to illustrate a specific but indemonstrable process. The conclusions
are then depicted mathematically (rationally) in the Divided Line, including both
proportionalities and means of moving from one state to the next; this falls within the field of
logos, for it determines whether the process is consistent with its respective parts and common
experience. In other words, this is essentially a form of analysis to determine whether the
various means of learning depicted in the myth are consistent with common experience. It is
worth noting, however, that the use of the Divided Line as an image or eikôn also establishes its
role as being, at least partially, in the realm of mythos. In this way, logos is immutably combined
with mythos in the logical and mythical portrayal of the learning process. Ultimately, this
reveals Plato’s fundamental understanding that logos and mythos are both interdependent and
functionally necessary in philosophy.
Mythos and logos, as has been previously shown, are related in the sense that both can
convey truth; however, they differ with respect to the types of truth that are conveyed as well as
the medium through which truth is produced. It is these differences that indicate an
interdependency between mythos and logos in Plato’s philosophy. To further understand this
relationship, we can look to another of Plato’s fundamental assertions: the tripartite division of
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the soul and state. In what constitutes a large part of Book VI of the Republic, Plato discusses
this topic, proceeding to the logical conclusion that there exists within both the soul and the state
a ruling function, a protective function, and a productive function. The reasoned support for this
is that, at any given time, man has the capacity to be pulled in different directions, i.e. he may
exhibit desire for something that his reason is indicating he should not have. As a basic example,
consider a scenario in which a man, while knowing that he needs to lose weight, is presented
with a large piece of delicious cake; his desire pushes him towards devouring the dessert, but his
reason, based in an understanding that cake greatly impedes his ability to lose weight, pushes
him away from the object that lies before him. Therefore, based on the Principle of NonContradiction, the soul must be made of different parts, for the same part cannot at the same time
be responsible for contrary emotions or actions. Of the three functions Plato identifies, the ruling
function is due to the rational part of the soul which is responsible for one’s intellect and
reason. In contrast, the protective function is a result of one’s thumos or spirited element which
induces emotions, while the productive function is of the appetitive part which is responsible for
one’s desire. These characteristics of the soul are further illustrated by the myth of the winged
charioteer in the Phaedrus; the ruling part of the soul is likened to the charioteer, while the
protective and productive parts are likened to the charioteer’s two horses– thumos and
appetite. As Plato shows, a harmony results when each part accomplishes its own function well,
such that the thumos and appetite are receptive to reason and submissive to the rational part, and
the appetite is also receptive to emotion and submissive to the thumos.
Interestingly, it turns out that Plato’s composition of the dialogues and his use of logos
and mythos precisely fit the Charioteer myth. Using the myth as a model, we can compare the
function of logos to that of the soul’s protective function; it protects against improper use of
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mythos by ensuring that it is a truly reasoned form of art. Moreover, it ensures that a myth’s
persuasive function and reasoned conclusions accord with common experience and scrupulous
principles. Mythos, on the other hand, is comparable to the soul’s productive function; it
artistically produces those views or premises from which logos ascertains and evaluates its
conclusions. It is this production of premises or starting points that provides logos with direction
for its demonstrations while the persuasive or motivational function of mythos produces practical
applications of those logical conclusions. Thus, the ruling function is Plato’s intelligence which
properly employs and directs both mythos and logos to produce the highly polished dialogues. In
other words, Plato is the charioteer, responsible for properly directing each of the steeds –
mythos and logos. Logos, then, is symbolized by the “noble and good steed,” receptive to and
reliant upon reason, while the steed of mythos is the very opposite, having the potential to make
philosophy “difficult and troublesome” (Phaedrus, 246b). If we are ever to perceive the beauty
of Plato’s genius and follow in his guidance, we must not discredit either logos or mythos
individually, but strive to understand their relationship and respective functions in the dialogues,
just as we strive to understand and discipline the parts of our souls. Otherwise, we will simply
“trample and tread upon one another,” (Phaedrus, 248b) becoming lame and broken in our mere
semblances of understanding and virtuous pursuits.
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